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ABSTRACT 
Problems in defining and studying religion are well known to us. What we might 
identify as a specific European legacy, now exported globally, could be more 
radically challenged by concerted efforts to respond to alternatives more positively 
and more robustly. This article identifies some problems for the study of religions: not 
only an inherited definition that privatises religion as ―belief‖ but also a theological 
legacy that encourages scholarly ambitions to divine objectivity. In setting out 
alternatives, I propose that starting ―elsewhere‖ will be helpful. Studies of material, 
performative, vernacular and lived religion establish some rich possibilities. A 
reconsideration of Maori tapu/taboo protocols may demonstrate the value of re-
theorising ―religion‖ beginning ―elsewhere‖ than the still normative refrain of ―belief 
and practice‖ encourages. In order to more radically indicate the problems of 
dominant scholarly approaches (rather than solely definitional issues) I say a little 
about ―witchery‖ in South Africa and the difficulties of knowing how to respond as a 
scholar of religion. My argument is that we must change our approaches because we 
have changed our definitions. 
 
 
* * * 
 
In this article based on my keynote lecture for the EASR 2013 conference, I seek to 
contribute to debates about religion and scholarship. Problems in defining and 
studying religion are well known to us. What we might identify as a specific European 
legacy, now exported globally, could be more radically challenged by concerted 
efforts to respond to alternatives more positively and more robustly. In setting out 
what I think the problem is (namely a European Christian Reformation, Nation State-
serving definition of religion), my task is made easier by its familiarity. In setting out 
alternatives, I propose that starting ―elsewhere‖ will be helpful. In part this strategy 
too is made easier because some of the alternatives to ―religion as private belief‖ are 
already somewhat familiar to us both from exemplary studies of material, 
performative, vernacular and lived religion, and from challenges to the ―world 
religions paradigm‖. I make use of selected alternatives, especially the ―elsewhere‖ of 
Maori tapu/taboo related practices. However, the problem I seek to face is not only 
with the definitions we employ to demarcate our field of study. Our scholarly practice 
as researchers and teachers is also significantly affected by the ideologies and 
processes legitimated in the same early-modern era that enshrined the priority of 
―believe‖ in definitions of religion. Thus, the same familiarity with possible alternatives 
makes our task more challenging because it is evident that the weight of our own 
scholarly tradition and of our modern(ist) context forcefully and/or subtly tends to 
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reinforce the definitions, approaches and foci of attention which we challenge. This is 
evident in monographs and discourses about religious material cultures which 
continue to treat ―things‖ as representations or solidifications of ―beliefs‖ or ideas. 
Words like ―symbol‖ and ―symbolism‖ sometimes (but not always) reveal the veiled 
presence of the standard approach. If too many textbooks and too many conference 
papers seem trapped by the gravitational pull of ―believing‖, the fantasy of scholarly 
objectivity and/or disengagement (originating in a theology of divine transcendence) 
is similarly maintained. A discussion of witchery in South Africa illustrates my struggle 
to find a scholarly way to engage with violent religion. 
 
Easing into the task 
I have sometimes set undergraduate students the task of presenting ideas about 
where they would take visiting space aliens who ask to be shown ―religion‖. I ask 
them to imagine such unlikely beings saying, ―We have been observing Earth and 
have seen what you call sports, politics, catering, tourism and botany, but we want to 
observe the thing you call religion. What can you show us?‖ Once they get the idea, 
students are usually good at this. At first some need help in getting past the idea that 
religion cannot be seen because it is defined as ―belief in god‖. Since most of my 
British students suppose that belief is a private or interior process, and that god is 
transcendent and/or immaterial, they assume that neither are actually observable. 
Only the derivative expressions of belief (e.g. in ritual, art or text) or inadequate 
representations of divinity (e.g. in ―idolatry‖) are considered observable. With effort 
and humour, my students and I find that we can do better than this. We start thinking 
about what people do and we boldly determine to focus on religion as an everyday 
activity. Sometimes we get creative: we wonder if the visiting aliens might use their 
senses differently from us, and need to hear or smell religion. The competitive sonic 
environment of multi-cultural, multi-religious cities (such as Jerusalem or Leicester) 
or the olfactory overload of places where animals are sacrificed or incenses are 
wafted serve as prompts to this thought-experiment. Once we imagine that the aliens 
really know nothing about religion, we discuss whether they might think that flower 
arranging or tea drinking are the most significant religious activities of Christian 
church-goers. Sometimes there is laughter when this is suggested, but we quickly 
realise that it is far from obvious why everyday matters like flower arranging and tea 
drinking are not standard items for research about religions. We commonly conclude 
that our textbooks are faulty if they do not engage with the full sensuousness of 
religious lives both in dramatic moments and in quotidian spans.  
 
More is at stake here than trying to follow the lead of pioneering colleagues who have 
encouraged the examination of vernacular, lived, performed and material religion 
rather than transcendent abstractions (e.g. Primiano 1995; Orsi 2005; McGuire 2008; 
Vásquez 2011). Nonetheless, we do need clarity about what data we should seek 
when we wish to understand ―vernacular‖ or ―lived‖ religion because these terms 
have been misused. We need to understand the horizons, if any exist, within which 
we pursue understandings of religion. But a related matter presents itself as soon as 
I contemplate horizons. That is the more difficult question of what position and/or 
posture enables us to perceive whatever happens between ―here‖ and those 
horizons? While a revolution is taking place in which religion is being defined in 
relation to everyday life and putatively mundane matters, a shift in understanding our 
scholarly performances has not been pursued with sufficient vigour. This is why my 
purpose in this article is to engage with two entwined issues: definitions of ―religion‖ 
and approaches to studying religion. My argument is that we must change our 
approaches because we have changed our definitions.  
 
Recognising that not all of us have in fact recognised the obsolescence of the ―world 
religions paradigm‖ or of the definition of religion as ―belief in spirits‖, I will summarise 
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what I think is a pervasive agreement about these. I can do this briefly because I 
cannot think of anything new to say about it. Nonetheless, I need to do it because I 
do not think we have been radical enough in rejecting the paradigm or the definition. 
(Perhaps I should say that I have no interest in debating with those who seek to 
defend the belief that believing is definitive or to promote it against the tide of 
opposition to the ―world religions paradigm‖.) Thus, I will argue while much of what 
these not-yet-entirely-decayed ideas invite us to assume about religion has been 
challenged, we remain burdened and distracted by their legacy in various ways. I can 
illustrate this here by pointing out that if religion is not definitively ―belief in spirits‖, 
many of our disciplinary obsessions with or polemics about, for example, objectivity, 
theology, insiders and outsiders look startlingly curious. In the next section of this 
article I will be reflecting on the legacy of the European Christian heritage of our 
dominant understandings of religion and its study.  
 
For more positive propositions about defining and studying religion, I propose to go 
elsewhere. In order to find contrasts with the European legacy that can still lead us to 
associate religion with interiority and metaphysics, I follow the traces of relationality, 
performativity and materiality into the alternative data of (somewhat familiar) 
vernacular religioning. In my experiments ―elsewhere‖ I have become increasingly 
convinced that the real barrier to understanding religious living is the legacy of a 
European notion of transcendence on our scholarly postures and practices. My 
primary concern, then, is not that we have wrongly defined religion as something 
concerned with transcendence and believing (though it is true that we have done so). 
More importantly, it is the scholarly conceit of attempting to transcend the real world 
of relatedness and participation that is most deeply damaging to studying religion and 
other facets of human and other-than-human life. In seeking to see religion 
happening in the elsewhere of embodiment, matter and relationships, I propose that 
we need to rethink our scholarly perspectives and performances. There is no single 
and unassailable way of doing this. I offer only some examples and some 
encouragement to trends that might help us match our best understandings of 
―religion‖ with better approaches to being scholars.  
 
World Religions 
I think I can assume that the ―world religions‖ paradigm is well known and robustly 
challenged by most colleagues in the field of the academic study of religion(s). 
Publications such as those of Fitzgerald (2000) and Masuzawa (2005) are almost 
canonical here. Many podcast interviews on the Religious Studies Project expand on 
the theme importantly (RSP 2013).  
 
Equally, I am fairly sure that many scholars of religion regularly problematise 
approaches to religion that treat scriptures, official creeds or founding statements as 
sufficient for the scholarly purpose of understanding, introducing or explaining 
religion(s). Nonetheless, for pragmatic reasons perhaps, many of our introductory 
modules and textbooks refer to the same range of six or seven religions and they 
frequently present a trajectory from founder (or early teacher at least) through text, 
scripture, teachings, institutions, historical development to leading or representative 
characters. Some introductions to religion or religions include brief discussion of 
―ordinary‖ people and their somewhat confused or syncretic knowledges of their 
―traditions‖. This is all too easy to lampoon. It is, however, a disciplinary addiction we 
seem to find it hard to kick. Witness how (despite the protestations of Leonard 
Primiano and others) the phrases ―vernacular religion‖ and ―lived religion‖ still get 
used (like ―popular‖ and ―folk‖) as if they refer to that which is not the proper, official 
teaching of a particular religion — understood once more as that official or textual 
core.  
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Some publishers too want books that fit those traditional courses that someone must 
still be teaching. There are, of course, exceptions, such as the ―Religions in Focus‖ 
project that colleagues and I are pursuing (initiated by Harvey 2009). Here we follow 
what I think is best practice in the study of religions: we treat religions as the lived 
realities of those who associate themselves with those lifeways — or even with the 
names people use to identify religions. We discuss what people do. If the scholarly 
community worked harder, we could persuade more publishers that we do not need 
any more ―world religions paradigm‖ textbooks. We do not need more books that 
treat the words, acts or ideals of founders and elites as definitive. In their place, we 
need more books that treat religions as continuously evolving performances and 
experiments that (potentially at least) touch all aspects of people‘s lived realities. 
(This is not to assert that everyone does live religiously at every moment, but only 
that the regular claim that religions are often lifeways rather than interruptions into 
ordinary reality is important.) 
 
The problem is somewhat larger, and it is not only ours. It is one that scholars of 
religion have adopted because of our broader context. This can be illustrated in the 
United Nations‘ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In Article 18 we read that 
everyone has the freedom to believe whatever we want, and the freedom to manifest 
our beliefs. (The Declaration‘s  assumption that ―everyone‖ is male is also 
problematic and, being anarchic, I have rejected its use of  ―his‖ in order to include us 
all.) I recognise that Articles 2 and 16 make religion similar to ―distinctions‖ like ―race, 
colour, sex, language, …, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status‖ and to matters like ―nationality‖. That is, these other articles give 
the impression that their framers knew that religion might be social or performative 
and not only individual or ideological. Nonetheless, the primary and habitual 
association of ―religion‖ is with matters of belief. It is a kind of intellectual or cognitive 
practice. It is primarily something done ―inside‖ individuals. It is taken to be a 
universal human freedom that cannot be legitimately constrained by political powers 
or other pressures. Indeed, it could be assumed that as a kind of ―freedom of 
thought‖ religion cannot be practically constrained, except by brainwashing or other 
forms of coercion. At any rate, although the UN declares that this is ―your world‖, it 
does not describe the world of people who think religion should define rules about 
food, clothing, sexual and marital relationships, political and social structures and, in 
at least some cases, ecological activism or military action.  
 
The fact that alleged manifestation of beliefs can be legally constrained while the 
believing itself is a sovereign act of private individuals reveals the genealogy of the 
idea. We have, in this declaration, not moved on from the privatisation of belief in the 
core texts of the documents that are thought to have resolved the early modern Wars 
of Religion (e.g. the Peace of Westphalia). Some might argue that we do not need to 
move on, that this historic definition of religion is entirely adequate, sufficient and 
even necessary. It is, after all, vital to modern notions of secularisation and 
citizenship in nation States. However, William Cavanaugh (1995) and Richard King 
(2007), among others, invite us to reconsider the ―Wars of Religion‖ as wars of State-
making. The invention and imposition of the notion and practice of nation States 
required a dramatic restriction of the domain of religion. Transnational relationships 
and commitments could not be allowed to distract citizens from their obligations to 
the princes and bureaucrats of the new world order. Here we see, among other 
things, the seeds of the polemic in which violence committed for religious reasons is 
―fundamentalism‖ or ―extremism‖ — both because violence can only be legitimate 
when conducted by or for the State but also because religion must now be a private 
matter of ―believing‖. It is this truncated notion of religion that has dominated 
subsequent thinking, legislation, conflicts and media-speak. As Bruno Latour (2010) 
and many others have argued, the assumption that others ―believe‖ while we (heirs of 
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early modern European rationalism) ―know‖ makes it harder rather than easier to 
understand ―other cultures‖. But equally, ―believing in belief‖ (as Latour says) makes 
it hard to understand ourselves and ―our culture‖, including our academic culture.  
 
There is, I know, far more that could or should be said here. I realise that the brevity 
of this presentation may suggest that a genetic fallacy (―religion was defined for 
modernity in a specific period and is therefore bad or inadequate‖) is being reified. 
However, I intend only to highlight what others have admirably demonstrated about 
the invention of States and the faulty theory that religion is about private beliefs and 
non-rational believing. I also honour the fact that other colleagues have said 
important things about the mutation of the European notion of religion-as-belief, and 
the privileging of the world religions paradigm globally, for example in the invention of 
Protestant style Buddhist movements, in the elevation of ―high gods‖ in various 
places, and in the acrobatic efforts to categorise religions as ―ethical‖ or ―ethnic‖, 
―institutional‖ or ―folk‖, ―major‖ or ―mixed‖, and so on. My point is that this definition 
serves political purposes well (for nation States) but misdirects the attention of 
scholars interested in lived religion (whether it is lived by citizens of such States or by 
other classes of person).  
 
What interests me now is experimenting with approaches to religion that move us 
further onwards. So I propose to leave behind the ―believer‖ and the ―man in his 
solitude‖ spiritually confronted by ―the numinous‖ or ―the sacred‖. I propose to stop 
thinking that religion is sufficiently defined as being about postulating non-empirical 
nonsense. I turn, instead, to seeking to understand what people do when they do 
religion.  
 
Doing Religion 
In Food, Sex and Strangers: Understanding Religion as Everyday Life (2013) I 
experiment with a range of phenomena which might enhance recent and new 
developments in thinking about religion. I draw on my fieldwork research among 
particular indigenous, Jewish and Pagan people, but also from less structured 
observation and some careful reading about other religious lives, including those of 
some Christians and some Pastafarians. Part of the way into writing the book I was 
somewhat surprised to realise that I was revisiting terms — like taboo, mana, 
totemism, fetishism, syncretism, purity and enchantment — that have been part of 
the technical apparatus of studies of religions and cultures since the nineteenth 
century, if not earlier. Bringing these into conversation with recent studies of lived 
religion and especially with Manuel Vásquez‘s (2011) proposal of a more vigorously 
materialist theory of religion seemed to me to justify the relational focus and 
approaches of colleagues interested in the ―new animism‖. One example is the 
proposal of Ken Morrison (1992, 2013) not only of a ―non-supernaturalist‖ theory of 
religion but also of a ―post-Cartesian‖ anthropology of religion (in turn citing the 
influence of Irving Hallowell, 1960). All of this is important but can only serve as 
background in this article.  
 
Instead of expounding or developing those ideas, I have selected one issue 
considered in Food, Sex and Strangers that illustrates some of the ways in which 
―elsewhere‖ cultural assumptions and performances might enhance our 
understanding of religion. I follow this with some thoughts about an issue that is only 
lightly touched on in the book but deserves further serious, sustained and swift 
attention. The first of these issues is taboo, the second is witchery. Both have to do 
with boundaries, exclusions, separations and, in various ways and to various 
degrees, violence.  
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Taboo 
The English language was enriched in the late eighteenth century by the adoption of 
the word ―taboo‖ from Oceanic languages or dialects. In the diaries of Captain Cook‘s 
1768-79 voyages the term appears several times with the comment that it ―has a 
comprehensive meaning‖ or ―seemed to be a word of extensive operation‖ (Cook 
1777: 3.1: 129, 157). Cook writes, for instance,  
 
―When dinner was served, not one of them would even sit down, or eat a 
morsel of any thing, as they were all taboo, they said; which word, though it 
has a comprehensive meaning, generally signifies that a thing is prohibited‖ 
(Cook 1777: 3.1:129). 
 
He also notes that his scientists were given a ―potato field‖ adjoining a morai in which 
to erect their astronomical observatory. He notes that:  
 
to prevent the intrusion of the natives, the place was consecrated by the 
priests, by placing their wands around the walls which inclosed [sic] it. This 
interdiction the natives call taboo, a term frequently used by the islanders and 
seemed to be a word of extensive operation. (Cook 1777: 3.1:157) 
 
The OED evidences a fairly rapid adoption of the word for use in British contexts and 
much the same is almost certainly true of other European languages. You were 
probably well aware that ―taboo‖ can mean ―prohibition‖, ―consecration‖ or 
―interdiction‖ because the term is so familiar to us. A range of contexts, some more 
―serious‖ than others, illustrate the usefulness of the term. Just as a sign from 
Hawaii‘s Waikiki Beach prefaces an injunction with the Native Hawaiian dialect 
version, ―Kapu‖, so common English signs that say ―Do not walk on the grass‖ could 
perhaps be prefaced by the word ―Taboo‖ without confusing anyone too much. In 
academic discourse about religion, too, we can apply the notion of ―taboo‖ more 
widely than with reference to Polynesia. We can speak about areas of temples being 
taboo to particular types of people, or of particular behaviours being taboo in 
churches or mosques. Ethnographies of indigenous religions, in particular, are alert 
to taboo protocols and practices in many places. We could compare and contrast 
taboo systems with Kashrut and Halal. We could debate Freud. We could ponder 
whether the ―burkini‖ illustrates taboos in Islamic costuming. Without hesitation we 
could apply and/or develop Mary Douglas‘ classic work, Purity and Danger (1992). In 
various ways, then, the term ―taboo‖ is a familiar component of our popular and 
critical vocabularies.  
 
However, my point here is to twist our thinking so that we make the word work as 
hard for us as it does for native Polynesian speakers. I want to struggle with the 
statement that ―sacred means set aside‖ so that this familiar assertion ceases to be 
quite so bland. I seek to recover the drama of the relational ebb and flow of words 
like taboo, sacred, holy and, indeed, religion.  
 
Not for the first or last time, I will cite my favourite foundation for a definition of 
religion — that of the late Maori scholar, Te Pakaka Tawhai. Speaking of the 
traditional knowledge of his people, Ngati Uepohatu, he wrote: ―The purpose of 
religious activity here is to … do violence with impunity‖ (1988: 101). Part of the 
explanation of this phrase is that despite the seemingly global injunction against 
killing it is also required that good people shelter and accommodate their guests and 
therefore need to cut down trees to build houses. In Maori contexts it is also 
imperative to provide meeting places where locals and their visitors can debate 
issues of mutual concern. The trees and their relatives need to be given respect. This 
is all the more clear when you know that the tree which Tawhai is thinking of has 
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been holding the sky apart from the earth. The tree (any tree, but particularly 
venerable old trees in forests) is Tane Mahuta, child of Mother Earth and Father Sky, 
strong separator of the primal parents. If it makes it easier to think of this as poetry, 
myth or metaphor that‘s fine, but perhaps we are here confronted with another aspect 
of the legacy of Europe: the post-Reformation difficulty of saying ―is‖ without suffering 
the interference of theological disputes about body and bread as symbols or 
representations. For now, I simply repeat the far from simple assertion that the tree is 
a separator.  
 
Moving on, the cut-down tree cannot become a shelter for guests without the labour 
of carvers and builders. A preeminent construction of Maori culture is the carved 
meeting house, wharenui or wharetipuna, in which locals and visitors can face each 
other. (I acknowledge that some people see carved sea-going canoes as 
preeminent.) In the house, the carved tree takes on a new role: separating the roof 
from the floor. Just as Tane separated his parents in order to make room for other life 
to flourish, so the space between floor and roof allows life and lively-debate to 
flourish. In both cases, life means diversity. In the forest world there is diversity of 
species, relations and interests. In the meeting house there is diversity of opinion and 
need, all seeking resolution between hosts and guests. To have entered the house 
peacefully is to have negotiated the protocol-structured encounter of locals and those 
who were at first potential guests and potential enemies. Some possibilities collapse 
in the fertile laboratory of the marae space between entrance gate and meeting 
house. Locals and visitors re-create each other as hosts and guests by approaching 
each other, speaking together, breathing together. Then the talking and negotiating 
move inside the ancestor house — the participants being eaten into the house and 
birthed out with new relations, new possibilities, new futures. Carvings on the inside 
and outside of many carved houses make this utterly explicit. (I elaborate on these 
themes in Harvey 2003 and 2005.)  
 
How does any of this help us understand how ―taboo‖ contributes to rethinking what 
―religion‖ might look like? How does it do more than add some data about indigenous 
cultures and their interaction with imperial ones? The challenge is to grasp the fully 
relational context and content of taboo discourses and practices. It is perhaps too 
easy to fix taboo into the kind of dualities that structure so much of European thought 
and behaviour — e.g. holy and profane, religion and secular. Rudolf Otto and 
Richard Dawkins seem worlds apart, but they both indulge in reifying separations and 
mistake them for observable distinctions. But ―taboo‖, ―holy‖ and ―sacred‖ are 
relational terms in their originating cultures. Something, someone or some state may 
be taboo or holy (or indeed, ―unclean‖ or ―impure‖) for a while, but may then become 
ordinary or, at least, accessible to a wider community. Maori meeting houses under 
construction may be tabooed to non-carvers (and there may be particular gender 
differentiations in play) but the taboo must be lifted and the entry opened widely for 
such houses to be more than admirable objects. Since inviting the admiration of art is 
not the purpose of traditional Maori carvers, taboo absolutely must cease if people 
are to approach, enter and use these meeting houses. In short, taboo is a phase in 
relationships not a permanent state.  
 
Returning from ―elsewhere‖, having struggled with Tawhai‘s ―doing violence with 
impunity‖ and other Maori knowledges, we might more fruitfully contemplate the 
dynamic fluidity and relationality of seemingly familiar terms. When we grasp that 
taboo making, maintaining and lifting are these kinds of relational processes —  
negotiations to support socialising between different persons, places, objects or acts 
— then perhaps we will find that sacred and profane are not dualistically opposed 
terms and, more dramatically, neither are religion and secular. Perhaps they are not 
even things to lay alongside each other, or the flip side of one thing. Rather, they are 
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fluid phases of ever-changing relationships. Perhaps this would aid the thought that 
flower arranging deserves more research as a religious act. Perhaps we should take 
seriously the common religious claim that religion is an all day every day matter.   
 
Without taking more time here I invite you to revisit ―taboo‖ and see if this 
encourages you to rethink the category religion within the dynamics of social 
relations in a larger-than-human world. If Tawhai‘s aphorism that the ―purpose of 
religious activity is doing violence with impunity‖ is applicable more widely, it points 
us towards a definition of religion itself as some kind of inter-personal relational act or 
behaviour. In Food, Sex and Strangers (Harvey 2013) I propose that religion is the 
etiquette of inter-species relationships. Since it is relational, it requires us to attend to 
local specificities rather than to seek universally normative practices.  
 
Furthermore, perhaps what is helpful to our scholarly task is the way in which, by 
both separating-and-linking people, places, acts and things, taboo protocols and 
procedures contest the bounded, boxed-in-ness of many representations of religion. 
If scholars of gender, ethnicity, age and class can study anything and everything, and 
do so without establishing a ―pure form‖, it seems unlikely that we should treat 
―religion‖ differently. Just as there is no opposite of those aspects of reality or of 
those categories of study (no ―not gender‖, ―not age‖, ―not class‖, but only different 
ways of organising whatever it is to which these terms refer), it seems unlikely and 
unhelpful to postulate something that is definitively ―not religion‖. Happily, of course, 
many scholars of religion have decided that if there is something called ―not religion‖, 
whatever that thing is can be studied by scholars of religions. There is, then, nothing 
that is ―not for us to study‖. There are, however, processes through which scholars of 
gender, politics, sport, religion, floristry and religion select aspects of the full ebb-and-
flow of relational live (the only kind there is) with which to engage. The illusory 
boundary between ―natural sciences‖ and ―social sciences‖ is, in the end, only useful 
as a means of focusing on particular features of the inherently interconnected 
meshwork of reality. (Just in case this seems baffling, humans are ―natural‖ and 
chimpanzees do culture but we need not dismantle our faculties if only we refuse to 
erect fantasy fences.)  
 
Witchery  
I am sure we are all quite tired of the promotion of ―nice‖ religions and the 
demonization of ―radical‖ ones. Our job probably ought to be about debating 
absolutely all manner of phenomena that present themselves as ―religion‖ or that 
might be theorised as ―religion‖. To privilege ―nice‖ religions is, perhaps, to acquiesce 
to the project of empowering States by demonising alternative social constructs or 
performances. Anyway, a number of potential cases or issues are available if we 
want to think about the not-so-nice or utterly life-threatening aspects of religion. 
These, I propose, may enrich our scholarly analysis of relational religion in lived 
reality. I turn here to trying to say something about witchery. This is a term I have 
learnt from Native American authors like Leslie Marmon Silko (1977) and use instead 
of ―witchcraft‖ because the latter is, in Humpty Dumpty‘s terms, overworked and 
underpaid (Carroll [1872] 1962: 274–5). 
 
While in South Africa in 2013 for the start of an international collaborative research 
project on ritual and democracy, funded by the Norwegian Research Council, I was 
taken to visit a refuge for mentally handicapped children. Precisely and only because 
of their health conditions these children are threatened with being used as resources 
for ―medicines‖. Without protection in the refuge, the body parts of such children can 
be used to combat others‘ problems or to empower their users. Even before arriving 
at the refuge to be protected against torture and murder, many of these children have 
been appallingly treated. Efforts to cure their mental or physical health problems, 
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sometimes perceived as possession or the anger of ancestors, have included having 
boiling water or ground glass forced down their throats. Others have been 
asphyxiated by hanging, causing further brain damage. Some have been raped by 
AIDS sufferers on the grounds that this might take away the disease.  
 
Some of the violence involved is related to witchery complexes. That is, human body 
parts are said to be used by witches in their evil-doing, but they can also be used in 
efforts to protect potential victims from the work of witches. Whether or not to believe 
in witches, witchery or this form of medicine is not the issue here. This is not a 
rumour of suffering children. Neither is this a dying practice of a marginal primitive 
community who only need more rational education. Reports suggest an increase of 
similar acts in many parts of Africa and beyond. The perpetrators include members of 
Christian Churches as well as members of ―traditional African religions‖. (Objections 
that this is ―not Christian‖ or ―not traditional‖ need to be based in more than 
assertions of nice-ness.) Perpetrators include people who have made a success in 
the competitive economic world of late capitalism — indeed, to buy some medicines 
made from tortured or murdered children requires considerable sums of money. This 
is one more element of the complex cultural and economic hybridity of modernity.  
 
A vast amount more needs to be said and done about this. I do not need to belabour 
that point. Despite the shock of seeing these damaged children, I am struggling to 
think about their situation within the constraints of academic studies of religion. The 
fact of their treatment is a bit of data that deserves inclusion in research and teaching 
about contemporary religions. I propose, however, that we need to do more than 
challenge the ―real religion is nice‖ cliché or blandly accept that religious boundary 
contests often involve violence. To return to Tawhai‘s provocative phrase ―doing 
violence with impunity‖, perhaps I need to clarify the point that he meant something 
different to ―just say please and sorry‖. A non-anthropocentric reading of Tawhai 
shows that impunity is only gained within respectful relationships. The ―other‖ must 
be a willing co-participant. Witchery and the ―medicine‖ of opposition to feared 
witchery do not involve mutuality and do not seek permission from the refuge children 
or other disabled children in the region. It is illustrative of the actively anti-relational 
behaviour expected of cannibals and other anti-social persons discussed in a 
different context by Morrison (2002).  
 
Why take time here to tell you about this refuge, these children and this witchery and 
―medicine‖? What does it have to do with the effort to think differently about religion? 
It most certainly grounds my thinking about lived religion within realism about 
violence. Rejecting the easy get-out that ―this is not religion‖, I seek to understand 
how witchery and medicine contribute to defining religion. Although it would be a 
salve to push the issue to someone else‘s discipline rather than ours, the fact that the 
perpetrators and refuge guardians claim religious involvements makes this a religious 
issue. I refuse to retreat into the discourse of ―belief‖ — not only because it hardly 
matters to the children if witches really exist, but more because its time we left 
―believing‖ out of our definitions of religion (except where believing is definitive of a 
specific religious activity). This may not be solely a religious issue but that‘s true of all 
religious facts and all other relational facts. Religion is not a boxed thing, a discrete 
object or performance, a neat –ism. Religion — like sport, politics, catering, literature, 
gender, class, ethnicity and age — is our critical term, the lens with which we focus 
on the ever shifting realities around us. 
 
Turning from the European, early modern political reification of ―religion as 
individuals‘ beliefs about matters that don‘t matter politically‖, witchery helps us to 
see another aspect of religion in a relational world. Relationships can be dangerous: 
people can seek power over others, domination rather than cooperation, greed rather 
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than sharing. People can fear and hate those they suspect of being greedy or selfish. 
They can also fear and hate those they perceive as being successful. Witchery, 
medicine and related complexes are religious aspects of these antipathies towards 
others. They are tragic examples of the drama of lived religion. They are also 
examples of activities that scholars of religion encounter in the course of research. 
No professional boundary can justify attempts not to respond. Indeed, ―doing nothing‖ 
or ―merely observing‖ is already a response. It is, in part, in struggling to understand 
appropriate ways in which we might respond as scholars that I find myself 
dissatisfied with only saying that witchery is part of the problem of defining religion. It 
is also part of the problem of defining scholarship.  
 
Brief recap 
So far I have outlined some common ideas about problems caused by the export of a 
specific understanding of religion into domains other than that of the needs of nation 
States. I have indicated enthusiasm for experimenting with data and approaches 
arising ―elsewhere‖ than the belief-centred world-religions approach. I have outlined 
some ideas about taboo and witchery that seem to me to offer potentially rich 
resources for thinking again about familiar as well as alien perspectives and realities. 
In the final section of this presentation I outline something more serious than the 
problem of knowing what our data is. I argue that the burden of a European notion of 
transcendence continues to skew our performance of scholarship.  
 
Real world academia 
We live in a thoroughly relational world and a thoroughly participative universe. (This, 
too, is part of Manuel Vásquez‘s important 2011 volume, More than Belief). 
Darwinian and quantum sciences are solid foundations for our understanding of our 
place in the evolving and intimately interactive scheme of things. You will be familiar 
with the phrase ―there are turtles all the way down‖ (turtles standing in for 
consciousness) and some of you will have heard my phrase ―there are hedgehogs all 
the way around‖ (hedgehogs standing in for all our co-evolving relations in the larger-
than-human community or ecology). There is nothing contentious here, I think. My 
problem is that I think we remain mired in the confusions of pre-Darwinian, pre-
scientific ideas about human exceptionalism. We continue to look for religion within 
people — not now in ―souls‖ but in ―mind‖, ―intellect‖, ―consciousness‖ or ―cognition‖. 
Until we fully and adequately engage with religion as lived by embodied, emplaced 
and participative persons, we keep the ―world religions paradigm‖ alive as an 
approach.  
 
There is more, however. In some of our incessant worries about colleagues who get 
too religious or about our students being too insiderly or theological, we sometimes 
assert notions of objectivity that are distinctly transcendental. Within a participative 
and interactive cosmos, as integral members of that cosmos, there is no position 
from which we can observe all things without some degree of participation. We 
cannot be like the transcendent and omniscient deity posited by some kinds of 
Christian theology. As Donna Haraway has said, we cannot do the god trick (1988: 
582) . There again, Latour says ―we‘ve never been modern‖ (1993). But in both cases 
we have been trying. Academics may be trying more than others. However, my 
contention is that if we stop thinking of religion as belief — as the ideas individuals 
might have about matters that do not or should not concern the State, government or 
wider society — and we fully engage with the idea that religion is as material and 
performative as sport, catering, politics or science (whatever they might be), then we 
could study it more skilfully and more appropriately. If we reject the duality 
objective/subjective (possibly along with other mystifying dualities) we may find more 
fluid and more relational ways in which to approach, analyse and debate the 
phenomena that interest us.   
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Fractal wrongness 
There is a fractal wrongness (Lee 2001) about the European originated notion of 
religion as belief and transcendence that has misdirected our attention away from 
lived religion and towards a fantasy of irrationality. Being fractal, believing in belief 
has also implicated scholars of religion in trying to avoid the contagion of religious 
ideas. But as religion is a relational activity in a material and participative world, there 
are other ways for scholars to engage with it. Materials and performances 
―elsewhere‖ than in the fantasy world of believers and sceptics provide ways of 
experimenting with different relations and theories. When John Lennon invited us to 
―imagine ... no religion‖ he rejected obsessions with transcendence by the 
synonymous (to him) imagination of there being ―no heaven no hell‖. But he also 
invited us to ―imagine there‘s no countries‖ and should we chose to see the 
apparatus and ideology of nation States as the enveloping fiction in which ―believers‖ 
are reformed for citizenship, we might find that religion can be re-imagined precisely 
as part of the ways in which people do live life for today. Perhaps this process of 
experimenting with the abandonment of believing (constituted as irrationality) may 
also enable us to hear other resonances in terms like ―belief‖ and ―faith‖ that do 
justice to the more relational implications of those religious discourses in which they 
occur. Perhaps our research and teaching would be enhanced by considering 
religious claims to have trusting relationships rather than unreasonable ideologies.   
 
Rejecting the notion of sui generis religion seems straightforward in theory. The effort 
to wean ourselves off the notion that religion is a mask of society or cognition or 
some other similarly mysterious imaginary is proving more difficult. Experimenting 
with treating tea drinking, flower arranging, tree cutting and house building as 
religious activities — and not as mere expressions or representations of religion — 
might fully liberate us from obsessing about beliefs and liberate us to engage fully 
with lived religion. This is a multifaceted project that ought to inject considerable 
vigour into the study of religion and justify our demands to be heard by our scholarly 
peers in interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary arenas as having something to say 
about important matters in the real world. Constellations of approaches to materiality, 
performance and relationality in vernacular and lived religion demand and reward 
efforts to engage more fully with real religion. This, however, requires that 
scholarship is also understood as a thoroughly relational performance.   
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